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ABSTRACT
The attorney-client privilege is one of the foundations of our
jurisprudence. Originally, designed to prevent attorneys from testifying
against their clients, the privilege eventually evolved to reflect legal, societal,
and financial complexities. This privilege depends on full disclosure and open
communication between attorney and the client in order to provide competent
and adequate representation. Today, attorneys often require and rely on expert
guidance of accountants for various issues pertaining to litigation and
transactional work.
This article illustrates how the recent cases of Commissioner v. Comcast
Corp. and United States v. Textron affect privileged communications in
complex tax and transactional matters between attorneys and accountants
retained for the purposes of client representation. The article also offers
guidance on how to preserve privilege in communication between attorneys
and accountants as waiver of such privilege may have significant and costly
implications. At conclusion, unresolved issues pertaining to privileged
communication are discussed and solutions are offered.
I. COSTLY IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVILEGE BREACH
Today’s complex financial and tax transactions almost always require
advice and assistance of attorneys, accountants, and tax professionals. Such
teams of experts are often necessary to translate and interpret increasingly
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1. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
2. Kelly Edmiston, Shannon Mudd & Neven Valev, Tax Structures and FDI: The Deterrent Effects
of Complexity and Uncertainty, 24 FISCAL STUD. 341, 343–44 (2003).
3. LAURA STEIN, WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A BALANCED APPROACH (2006),
http://www.wlf.org/upload/thornburgh.pdf.
4. Jocelyn Allison, U.S. v. Textron Raises Concern Over Work Product, LAW360.COM, Oct. 9,
2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/123606 (stating the holding in Textron is “important to the IRS and
companies that file audited financial statements”).
5. In this context, the available privileges include attorney-client privilege, accountant-client
privilege, work-product doctrine, and tax-practitioner privilege.
6. James Hamilton, Corporate Counsel Group Assails First Circuit Tax Audit Work Papers
Ruling, PCAOB REP., Sept. 22, 2009, at 4.
complex tax laws.  Complex tax legislation, fluctuating and numerous tax1
rates and tax bases, and the number of special tax provisions and exceptions
to those provisions contribute to the difficulty of tax practice and planning.2
Absent a team effort, even experienced attorneys may have to proceed into
multifaceted transactions without a thorough understanding of their
consequences, thus exposing their clients to potential and significant risks.
Open communications, protected by privilege, are a key to successful
implementation of a client’s goals. In order to obtain the utmost advantage
from communications with accountants, attorneys must be able to have open
conversations without fear that these discussions may at a future time become
available to discovery by third parties, such as the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), State and Local Tax (“SALT”) agencies, and other governmental
bodies. If clients perceive that privilege laws do not protect their
communications with attorneys, clients will be discouraged from openly
conferring with their counsel, which inevitably will result in less effective
legal compliance.3
Recent Comcast and Textron decisions raise important new issues and
concerns for attorneys and their clients about the waiver and inapplicability
of corporate taxpayers’ privileges during complex transactional matters or
compliance with federal and state laws and regulations.  Communication of4
sensitive and privileged information from attorneys to accountants is
necessary to construct a transaction or to comply with reporting requirements.
The Comcast and Textron decisions suggest that such communication may
result in waiving all available privileges.5
Disclosure of internal and privileged corporate information to taxing
authorities diminishes the preventative and strategic roles of a public
company’s in-house counsel  and undermines corporate tax planning. When6
the taxing authorities can obtain access to work papers and other privileged
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8. En Banc First Circuit Rules For IRS In Textron Accrual Disclosures, STANDARD FED. TAX REP.
1–2, Aug. 2009, at 1, 2. See also Keith J. Anzel, Cheryl Claybough, Chris Oates, David Robison, &
Michael J. McGoldrick, Session 11: Risk-Based Approach to Large Corporate Audits, TAXES—THE TAX
MAG., June 2009, at 125, 126 (stating that the IRS continues to evaluate the policy of restraint as tax
accrual work papers during an audit would help to facilitate and accelerate the resolution process).
9. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, INTERPRETATION NO. 48, ACCOUNTING FOR
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES, AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 109 (prescribing a
recognition threshold and measurement attribute for the financial statement recognition and measurement
of a tax position taken or expected to be taken in a tax return and providing guidance on derecognition,
classification, interest and penalties, accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and transition).
10. Robert W. Wood & Alfred K. Leong, Tax Accrual Workpapers May Be Privileged, M & A TAX
REP., Nov. 2007, at 3–5. See also Jean Pawlow & Kevin Spencer, Adrift In a Sea of Uncertainty: Tax
Accrual Workpapers Are Work-Product . . . But Showing Them to Your Auditor May Waive the Protection,
TAX EXECUTIVE, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 33, 37 (stating that “[g]iven the First Circuit’s holding on waiver, it
is unclear whether disclosing a FIN 48 opinion to your independent auditors will waive the work product
privilege”).
11. See Philip C. Cook, Practical Suggestions To Enhance The Work Product Protection of Client
Tax Accrual and FIN 48 Workpapers, PRAC. TAX LAW., Feb. 2009, at 33.
12. Scott Edwards, MASSACHUSETTS: Massachusetts High Court Applies Broad ‘Because of’
Expected Litigation Test to Exclude Accountant’s Memos Under Work-Product Doctrine, J. OF
MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES, July 2009, at 36–38.
information, they can determine where the taxpayer believes its asserted tax
position is weak and amounts reserved to pay the tax if litigation ensues.  This7
information may allow the IRS and SALT agencies to pursue and challenge
any transaction where there may be a chance of tax avoidance planning, even
if permitted by the current statutory regime. The disclosure of privileged
documents may provide the taxing authorities with a roadmap for additional
audits. These new developments also raise concern of whether the IRS will
abandon or modify its policy of restraint on limiting its future work papers
request to taxpayers engaging in listed transactions.8
The Textron decision specifically suggests that a company’s FIN 48 work
papers  are no longer fully protected and immune from discovery by the taxing9
authorities.  As FIN 48 work papers contain sensitive information about tax10
effects on which the corporate position may not be certain, the content of
these documents is enticing to IRS and SALT auditors and compliance
officers.  The Comcast decision reminds practitioners of limitations of11
current privilege law pertaining to communication between attorney and
external accountants and shows that SALT authorities are willing to challenge
complex corporate transactions to bolster state revenue.  Comcast also is12
consistent with the trend by SALT authorities of auditing multi-state
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13. See Cook, supra note 11, at 33.
14. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
15. Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Mass. 2007).
16. P.R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:1, at 6 (2d ed. 1999).
17. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
18. Karen J. Mathis, President of American Bar Association, Statement Before the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee, A.B.A., Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
whitecollarcrime_blog/files/attyclientprivissueabatestimonytosenjudcommkarenmathissept122006.pdf.
19. FED. R. EVID. 501.
20. United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Wilcoxon v. United States,
structures and transactions more aggressively, which inevitably leads to
disclosure of work papers and related tax planning advice.13
II. PRIVILEGES
By their nature, all privileges limit access to the “complete” truth.14
However, almost all privileges are limited and restricted either by definition,
exceptions to the definition, or by other specific limitations. Professionals
commonly assert privileges such as the attorney-client privilege, work-product
doctrine, and tax practitioner privilege during litigation when the opposing
side requests disclosure of private information and documents. Knowledge of
when to exercise the privilege and of all applicable exceptions will allow
practitioners to serve in clients’ best interests and avoid unnecessary legal
exposure.
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the foundations of our
jurisprudence. The attorney-client privilege protects all confidential
communications between a client and its attorney undertaken to obtain legal
advice.  It is well established, appearing first in the sixteenth century,  and15 16
is often recognized as one of the oldest confidential communications
privileges known to the common law.  It is also considered to be a “bedrock17
of the client’s rights to effective counsel and confidentiality” in obtaining
legal advice.  In the federal system, the attorney-client privilege is governed18
by the principles of the common law.  Under the common law, the important19
element of the attorney-client privilege is “whether the communication
between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship
and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the
communication will remain in confidence.”20
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231 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir. 1956)).
21. Comm’r v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Mass. 2009) (quoting WIGMORE, 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)) (stating “(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is
sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived”). This formulation has
been frequently used by federal courts.
22. Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (Mass. 2007). See also
United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976)) (stating the purpose of the privilege is “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
attorneys”); Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. 416, 422 (1834) (stating the attorney-client privilege exists to
enable the attorney to “successfully to perform the duties of his office”).
23. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196.
24. United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981) (citing WIGMORE, 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2302 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)) (stating “the privilege is extended to those who make
confidential communications to an individual in the genuine, but mistaken, belief that he is an attorney”).
The reasonableness depends on circumstances of each case.
25. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997).
26. See id. at § 503.12.
27. Gretchen Eoff, Losing the War on Attorney-Client Privilege: Viewing the Selective Waiver
Quagmire Through the Tenth Circuit’s In re Qwest Communications International, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 79,
81 (2008).
28. See In re The Inv. Bankers, Inc., 30 B.R. 883, 886 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
The classic formulation of the attorney-client privilege states that where
legal advice is sought, the communication relating to that purpose made in
confidence by the client to attorney is permanently protected from disclosure,
unless the privilege is waived.  The attorney-client privilege enables clients21
to fully disclose to their attorney all relevant facts, no matter how
embarrassing or damaging these facts might be, so that the attorney may
render fully informed legal advice.  To be considered privileged, the22
information contained within the communication between attorney and client
need not itself be confidential; rather, the communication must be made in
confidence.23
For the purposes of the privilege, an attorney is any person whom the
client reasonably believes to be a lawyer  authorized to practice law in any24
state or nation.  The attorney-client privilege may be asserted even if the25
communication is not privileged in the jurisdiction where the attorney is
licensed.  The privilege applies to individuals and corporations.  The26 27
attorney-client privilege is extended to individuals employed by the lawyer to
assist in rendering professional legal services.  Thus, this principle applies to28
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29. WEINSTEIN & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 25, at § 503.01 (regarding U.S. Supreme Court
Standard 503). Note that Supreme Court standards are not part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but have
been relied upon and cited by other courts. See United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 1986).
30. In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 482 (1990).
31. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. See also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 870
N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Mass. 2007) (quoting In re A Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (Mass.
2002), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023 (Mass. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985)) (“The attorney-client privilege is so highly valued that, while it may
appear ‘to frustrate the investigative or fact-finding process . . . [and] create an inherent tension with
society’s need for full and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence during implementation of the judicial
process,’. . . it is acknowledged that the social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers acting for their clients . . . outweigh[s] the harm that may come from the suppression of the
evidence.”).
32. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Weil v. Inv./Indicators,
Res. & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating “[b]ecause it impedes full and free discovery
of the truth, the attorney-client privilege is strictly construed”); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.
1973) (“[T]he privilege stands in derogation of the public’s ‘right to every man’s evidence’ and as ‘an
obstacle to the investigation of the truth,’ [and] thus, . . . ‘[i]t ought to be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.’”).
33. Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984)) (“[T]he doctrine of construing the privilege narrowly . . . has
particular force in the context of IRS investigations given the ‘congressional policy choice in favor of
disclosure of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry.’”).
34. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1195.
35. In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997). See also
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Zerendow), 925 F. Supp. 849, 854 (D. Mass. 1995); Resolution Trust Corp.
the lawyer’s staff, consultants, or other agents employed for assistance with
legal services.29
At times, the attorney-client privilege conflicts with society’s interest of
full and complete disclosure, but it is a sacrifice society must absorb to offer
justice for every citizen.  This impediment to client’s communication with the30
attorney promotes greater public interest in the observance of law and
administration of justice.  However, this is balanced by the attorney-client31
privilege being strictly and narrowly construed.  When the taxpayer’s32
information is being withheld from the government in a tax enforcement
proceeding, the narrow construction of privilege is particularly appropriate.33
The party asserting the attorney-client privilege has the burden of
establishing that attorney-client privilege applies to the communication or
documents requested.  The burden includes proving the existence of the34
attorney-client relationship and other elements such as: (1) the
communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s
search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) the
communications were made in confidence; and (3) the privilege as to these
communications has not been waived.35
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v. Dean, 813 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (D. Ariz. 1993) (“[I]n order to establish the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege to a given communication, the party asserting the privilege must affirmatively demonstrate
non-waiver of the privilege.”); Colonial Gas Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 F.R.D. 600, 604 (D. Mass.
1992); MURL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, § 2.05 n.156, at 2-114 to 115 (1997).
36. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979); Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81; United
States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144–45 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 860–62
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F. Supp. 1176, 1177–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Handgards,
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Haymes v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572,
576–77 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161, 1191 (D.S.C.
1974); ITT Corp. v. United Telephone of Florida, 60 F.R.D. 177, 185–86 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
37. See WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 2325. But see In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997) (“[T]he modern trend, however, has moved toward a principle that
the privileged status of a communication or document is not lost when an attorney and client take
reasonable precautions to ensure confidentiality but, for example, a privileged communication is
nonetheless overheard.”); Smith v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
38. United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (providing in relevant parts that “a party may not discover documents
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But,
subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if: (i) they are otherwise discoverable under
Rule 26(b)(1); and (ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and
cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”).
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
41. Id. at 511.
42. Mathis, supra note 18.
A voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney
communication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such
communications on the same subject.  If the contents of a document or36
communication become public, the confidentiality and privilege are
destroyed.  Accordingly, a disclosure of attorney-client communication to an37
accountant will undermine and may waive the attorney-client privilege.38
B. Work-Product Doctrine
The work-product doctrine is a codified law under the federal rules of
civil procedure,  which was first recognized by the Supreme Court in39
Hickman v. Taylor.  The work-product doctrine enhances the litigation40
system by insulating attorney’s work from intrusions, inferences, or
borrowings by other parties.  This doctrine “underpins our adversarial justice41
system” and permits lawyers to prepare for litigation without fear that their
work product and mental impressions will be revealed to adversaries.  The42
purpose of the work-product doctrine is to establish a “zone of privacy for
strategic litigation planning” and to prevent one party from piggybacking on
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43. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 238 (1975)).
44. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510.
45. Ward v. Peabody, 405 N.E.2d 973, 980 (Mass. 1980).
46. In re Powerhouse Licensing, LLC, 441 F.3d 467, 473 (6th Cir. 2006).
47. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998).
48. Id. See also In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 462, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Bowne v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Martin v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 140
F.R.D. 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
49. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198.
50. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343 (1994). See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992); Binks
Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1983); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987); Senate of Puerto Rico v. United
States Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
51. United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2006).
52. Id. (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
53. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 149 (D.R.I. 2007), aff’d in
another party’s preparation  by protecting attorney’s written materials and43
mental impressions.  The doctrine includes on-going litigation and litigation44
that is to be reasonably anticipated in the near future.45
A party asserting the work-product privilege has the burden of proof in
establishing that the protected documents were prepared in anticipation of
litigation.  The phrase “in anticipation of litigation” has been subject to46
various interpretations. As a result, two main tests have developed: first,
whether the documents protected by the work-product privilege were prepared
“primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation,” and second, whether the
documents were prepared “because of” existing or expected litigation.  The47
first test would potentially exclude documents containing analysis of expected
litigation, if their primary, ultimate, or exclusive purpose is to assist in making
the business decision.  The second test includes documents, despite the fact48
that their purpose is not to “assist in” litigation.  The “because of”49
formulation states that documents are considered to be prepared in the
anticipation of litigation if “in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have
been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.”50
The documents are not protected if they were created for non-litigation
purposes.  Thus, when determining whether a particular document should be51
withheld from discovery production, one should look to the function that
document serves.  After the burden is satisfied, it shifts to the other party to52
demonstrate a substantial need for the requested information.53
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part, 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The burden of establishing ‘substantial need’ rests on the party seeking
to overcome the privilege.”).
54. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1202.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 145 (D. Mass. 2004).
58. Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 4 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“[T]he courts will not permit
the corporation to merely funnel papers through the attorney in order to assert the privilege.”). See also
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n., 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he privilege would never
be available to allow a corporation to funnel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers for
custodial purposes and thereby avoid disclosure.”).
59. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Maine v.
United States Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134
F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998))). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“An attorney may not be used to insulate records an individual previously has prepared for his business.
Thus, if an attorney instructs his client to deliver to the lawyer documents previously created by the client,
those documents are not attorney work product, nor are they protected by the attorney-client privilege.”).
60. Textron, 577 F.3d at 25 (citing Maine v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st
Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998))).
61. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982).
62. Textron, 577 F.3d at 31.
The work-product doctrine’s protection may be overcome if the party
seeking discovery can demonstrate a substantial need for materials and is
unable to obtain the equivalent materials by other means without an undue
hardship.  The standard for such disclosure is either absolute or heightened54
and is only appropriate in rare or extremely unusual circumstances.55
However, the disclosure is limited because the courts protect against
disclosure of attorney’s or attorney’s representatives mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.  Attorney’s opinion work product is56
afforded greater protection than fact work product.57
There are multiple circumstances where the work-product doctrine does
not apply. For instance, the work-product doctrine will be ineffective if the
asserted privileged materials and documents are simply “funneled” through an
attorney to create protection.  The work-product doctrine does not insulate58
documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of a client’s business.59
The work-product doctrine is also inapplicable if the documents would have
been routinely created irrespective of the litigation.  The doctrine does not60
apply to documents utilized in the analysis of bringing a company’s financial
books into conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.61
Further, the doctrine does not apply to an attorney’s preparation of corporate
documents or other materials in the ordinary course of business.62
220 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 28:211
63. Cavallaro, 284 F.3d at 246. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984)
(citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)). See also United States v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 623 F.2d 725, 729 (1st Cir. 1980) (declining to depart from Couch’s general rule); Mark A. Segal,
Accountants and the Attorney-Client Privilege: In the Future, Privilege May Apply to a New and Broader
Range of Situations, J. ACCT., Apr. 1997, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/1997/Apr/
segal.htm.
64. Francis M. Dougherty, Privileged Communication Between Accountant and Client, 33 A.L.R.
4th 539, § 2(b) (2009).
65. Id.
66. Id. (noting the following states recognize accountant-client privilege: Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania). See also David
E. Funkhouser III, Whose Right Is It Anyway: Arizona’s Statutory Accountant-Client Privilege, MARICOPA
L., Jan. 2006, http://www.quarles.com/docs/Client%20Privilege.pdf.
67. Zepter v. Dragisic, 237 F.R.D. 185, 189 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
68. United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1966); Sansom Refining Co. v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 92 F.R.D. 440, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Rubin v. Katz, 347 F. Supp. 322, 324 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
69. Emtec, Inc. v. Condor Tech. Solutions, Inc., No. 97-6652, 1998 WL 242603, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
May 14, 1998).
70. Id.
C. Accountant-Client Privilege
In contrast to the attorney-client privilege, there is no confidential
accountant-client privilege under federal or common law.  Accordingly, if63
litigation involves “federal question” jurisdiction or a federal administrative
proceeding, the accountant-client privilege will not be recognized.  In64
diversity jurisdiction cases, where state laws may be applied thus creating
choice of law issues, courts have to decide whether to apply state statutes that
permit accountant-client privilege or follow the common law approach.65
Currently, eleven states recognize accountant-client privilege under their
state laws.  The general purpose of the accountant-client privilege is “to66
encourage people to make use of professional accounting services and to be
frank and candid with such professionals.”  The accountant-client privilege67
is strictly construed because it has not been recognized under the common
law.  The privilege belongs to the client and not the accountant,  which68 69
allows the client to waive the privilege when acting inconsistent with its
assertion.70
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71. See I.R.C. § 7525 (2004) (noting this privilege is effective to communications made on or after
July 22, 1998).
72. Id. at § 7525(a)(1). See Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 569 F.3d 626, 628–29 (7th Cir.
2009); United States v. BDO Seidman, No. 02C4822, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1634 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2003)
(noting that § 7525 allows for identity of the client privilege).
73. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(3)(A).
74. See id. § 7525(a)(2)(A).
75. See id. § 7525(a)(2)(B).
76. See id. § 7525(b); United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003).
77. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500–02 (7th Cir. 1999).
78. United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002).
79. BDO Seidman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1634, at *1–2.
80. Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3:01-CV-1290, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23224,
at *15 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2002).
81. BDO Seidman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1634, at *10.
D. Tax Practitioner Privilege
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 7525 extends the common-
law attorney-client privilege for communications with federal tax
practitioners.  Specifically, tax practitioner privilege applies to71
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax
practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged
communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.  The tax72
practitioner is defined as any individual who is authorized under federal law
to practice before the IRS.73
Similar to others, this privilege contains multiple limitations. The
privilege may only be asserted in non-criminal tax matters before the IRS74
and non-criminal tax proceedings in a federal court brought by or against the
United States.  The privilege does not apply to communications regarding tax75
shelters.  Section 7525 also does not protect work product,  and can be76 77
waived in the same matter as the attorney-client privilege. Although the
Section 7525 privilege does not protect communications between the tax
practitioner and client simply for preparation of a tax return,  it does apply to78
communications for tax planning advice  or an opinion letter.  Akin to the79 80
attorney-client privilege, the Section 7525 privilege must be construed
narrowly.81
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82. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196.
83. Ackert, 169 F.3d at 139. See also Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962);
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
84. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 920–21. The Kovel doctrine has deep roots in Massachusetts jurisprudence.
See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. 609, 616 (2007) (explaining privilege
protects “statements made to or shared with necessary agents of the attorney or the client, including experts
consulted for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of such advice”); Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89, 94
(1831) (noting privilege extends to communications with agents of attorney who are “necessary to secure
and facilitate the communication between attorney and client”).
85. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 918. See also Edwards, supra note 12, at 37; Segal, supra note 63 (noting
that as a result of Kovel, attorney-client privilege to accountants can apply when: an attorney-client
relationship exists, the accountant is retained by the attorney, the accountant renders services that abet the
provisions of legal services, and the parties do not waive the privilege).
86. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922).
87. Ackert, 169 F.3d at 139.
88. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
III. ACCOUNTANT’S COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATTORNEYS
A disclosure of attorney-client communication to a third party, such as an
accountant, generally undermines the attorney-client privilege.82
Communication between an attorney and an accountant does not become
protected by attorney-client privilege simply because the communication
proves to be important to the attorney’s ability for client’s representation.83
However, an exception known as the derivative attorney-client privilege, also
referred to as the Kovel doctrine, allows for attorney-client privilege
protection.84
The Kovel doctrine shields communications of third parties, such as
accountants, hired to facilitate communication between attorneys and clients.85
The Kovel doctrine generally extends the attorney-client privilege and protects
communications of accountants to facilitate communication between attorney
and client, thus assisting the attorney in rendering legal advice to the client.86
Further, the inclusion of accountants in attorney-client communications does
not destroy the privilege if the purpose of the third party’s participation is to
improve the comprehension of the communications between attorney and
client.87
The court in Kovel stressed that today’s complexities prevent attorneys
from effectively handling client’s affairs without help of others.  The court88
stated that the presence of an accountant while the client is relating a
complicated tax fact pattern to an attorney should not compromise the
attorney-client privilege any more than a linguist helping with a translation
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89. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922).
90. Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise
of United States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977, 982 (2003).
91. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922).
92. Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002).
93. Id.
94. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Md. 2003) (“Cases decided after
Kovel have narrowly interpreted this concept of derivative privilege.”).
95. Ackert, 169 F.3d at 139 (“[A] communication between an attorney and a third party does not
become shielded by the attorney-client privilege solely because the communication proves important to the
attorney’s ability to represent the client.”); United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065,
1071 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The interpreter analogy and the statement that the accountant is needed to facilitate
the client’s consultation both strongly indicate that Kovel did not intend to extend the privilege beyond the
situation in which an accountant was interpreting the client’s otherwise privileged communications or data
in order to enable the attorney to understand those communications or that client data.”); In re G-I Holdings
Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 434 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting the Kovel privilege is limited to “when the accountant
functions as a ‘translator’ between the client and the attorney”).
96. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922).
97. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190–91 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444, 449–50 (D. Minn. 1971).
98. Gruetzmacher, supra note 90, at 988 (“The privilege, if any, does not arise until after the
accountant enters into a Kovel agreement with the law firm.”).
99. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922). See Olender v. United States, 210
when the client speaks a different language than attorney.  The premise is89
that, even to an attorney, the U.S. tax laws can often seem as
incomprehensible as a foreign language.  Often the accountant’s presence is90
“necessary,” if not essential, for effective communication between the
attorney and the client, which the attorney-client privilege was designed to
protect.  The “necessary” element means more than simply useful and91
convenient.  Further, the courts have stated that the accountant’s presence92
must have been nearly “indispensable” or serve “some specialized purpose”
in communication between client and attorney.  The courts interpreted the93
Kovel doctrine narrowly,  and have rejected its application in circumstances94
where an attorney’s ability to represent a client was only substantially
improved by the accountant’s presence and assistance.95
Following the creation of the Kovel doctrine, additional case law
substantially restricted its original breadth. For instance, for the Kovel
doctrine to be applicable, the client must seek privilege for legal advice and
not accounting services.  The doctrine begins to apply only after the law firm96
has retained the accountant.  Thus, client’s communications with an97
accountant prior to law-firm accountant engagement are not protected by the
Kovel doctrine.  Further, if the client seeks the accountant’s advice rather98
than the lawyer’s, attorney-client privilege does not exist.  The Kovel doctrine99
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F.2d 795, 805–06 (9th Cir. 1954).
100. Ackert, 169 F.3d at 139; Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
101. Gruetzmacher, supra note 90, at 994.
102. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1188.
103. Id. at 1189 (noting that Continental and Teleport were Massachusetts corporations).
104. Id. (stating that the Feb. 28, 1997 settlement required US West to first reduce its ownership of
TCG common stock to less than 10 percent within four months, June 30, 1997, and then completely divest
of its interest in TCG by Dec. 31, 1998).
105. Id. at 1190 (noting that Continental Holding was formed under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 8
only applies to situations where the accountant works as a translator of
information from client to attorney.  Thus, as a result of these numerous100
limitations, the general concept of the Kovel doctrine is now highly limited
and littered with exceptions.101
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The two recent cases of Commissioner v. Comcast Corp. and United
States v. Textron put a new spin on the existing privilege law and its effects
on the privileged communications between attorneys and accountants retained
for the purposes of client representation in complex transactional tax and
compliance matters.
A. Comcast
In Comcast, the Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed whether the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine protects from disclosure
communications between an in-house corporate counsel and outside tax
accountants consulted for purposes of structuring a stock sale.102
In 1996, US West purchased Continental Cablevision (“Continental”).
Continental, through a wholly owned subsidiary, Continental Teleport, Inc.
(“Teleport”), owned 11.2% of the stock of Teleport Communications Group,
Inc. (“TCG”).  Upon acquisition, Continental Cablevision immediately103
merged into MediaOne, US West’s wholly owned subsidiary. The Department
of Justice filed a civil antitrust action against US West and Continental, which
was settled on the premise that US West would divest all interest in TCG
stock.  US West created a new entity, Continental Holding Company104
(“Continental Holding”), dissolved Teleport on the same day, and
simultaneously transferred Teleport’s assets and TCG shares to Continental
holding.  Thereafter, US West divested itself of TCG shares in four separate105
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as a Massachusetts corporate trust).
106. Id. (stating that the capital gain reported by Continental Holding on its Dec. 31, 1997 tax return
was $495,733,830; Continental Holding claimed an exemption under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 8(b) for
filing a Massachusetts corporate excise tax return).
107. Id. at 1190 n.10. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62, § 8(b) (West. 2005) (repealed 2008).
108. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1190.
109. Id. at 1191.
110. Id.
111. Id. (noting that Ottinger stated that he considered “various ways to set up the transaction, to
determine the best, legitimate vehicle by which to deal with the tax consequences from the sale of [TCG]
shares, and to assess the risks of litigation associated with the different vehicles”).
112. Id. at 1189.
113. Id. at 1190.
114. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1191.
115. Id. at 1191 n.13 (stating that one of the preparer’s, Michael E. Porter III, was licensed to practice
law, but was precluded from practicing law while employed by Andersen).
transactions. Continental Holding reported a capital gain of nearly $500
million from the sale of TCG shares on its federal tax return, but did not file
a Massachusetts corporate excise tax return, claiming an exemption as a
Massachusetts corporate trust.  Under Massachusetts law, a corporate trust106
that qualifies as a holding company was exempt from state tax.  Two years107
later, Continental Holding was dissolved and its assets were transferred to US
West’s successor.108
The stock transaction was likely to have substantial tax consequences for
US West.  Although US West’s in-house counsel, Andrew Ottinger, was an109
experienced tax litigator, he was unfamiliar with Massachusetts tax law.110
Ottinger examined planning opportunities for the transaction, but needed the
expertise of outside consultants to help him interpret Massachusetts state tax
law.  In particular, Ottinger was concerned that the Massachusetts111
Department of Revenue (DOR) would challenge the appropriateness of the
transaction for US West’s sale of TCG stock.  Thus, prior to West’s112
disposition of TCG stock, Ottinger sought the advice of tax professionals at
Arthur Andersen (“Andersen”).  Upon Ottinger’s request, Andersen prepared113
a memorandum describing pros and cons, planning opportunities and possible
litigation risks.  At deposition, Andersen professionals who prepared the114
memorandum testified that they provided tax and planning advice, and not
legal advice.  However, Ottinger stated that he considered all communication115
with Andersen to be protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work
product. Ottinger took steps to ensure that Andersen’s documents remained
confidential and privileged by sending Andersen’s documents to the separate
226 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 28:211
116. Id. at 1191.
117. Id. at 1189 (stating that the Comcast Corporation (Comcast) is the successor company to AT&T
Broadband, which is successor to MediaOne Group, Inc. (MediaOne), which is the successor to US West,
Inc. (US West)).
118. Id. at 1188.
119. Id.
120. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1192 (stating that the commissioner argued that if there was no
legitimate business or economic purpose, the step transaction rule could be invoked, which would treat the
series of separate transaction steps if such steps were in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused
towards a particular result. Thus, if intermediate steps of the transaction had no legitimate purpose beyond
tax avoidance, the step may be collapsed for tax purposes under the step transaction doctrine.). See also
Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r, 795 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 2003); Penrod v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987);
Comm’r v. Dupee, 670 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1996); Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156.
121. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1188 (noting that the commissioner issued the administrative summons
pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62 C, § 70, which provides: “[t]he commissioner may take testimony and
proofs under oath with reference to any matter within the official purview of the department of revenue, and
in connection therewith may issue summonses and require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of books, papers, records, and other data. Such summonses shall be served in the same
manner as summonses for witnesses in criminal cases issued on behalf of the commonwealth, and all
provisions of law relative to summonses in such cases shall, so far as applicable, apply to summonses issued
hereunder. Any justice of the supreme judicial court or of the superior court may, upon the application of
the commissioner, compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of books, papers, records, and other
data, and the giving of testimony before the commissioner in the same manner and to the same extent as
before the said courts.”).
122. Id. at 1191–92 (stating that the commissioner originally sought production of all documents
identified by Comcast in its privilege log. The commissioner sought the production of documents pertaining
and locked files of West’s law department maintained for privileged
documents.116
In 2000, the Massachusetts DOR commenced an audit examination of
Comcast and its affiliates pertaining to the acquisition of Continental by US
West.  In particular, the DOR investigated whether Comcast and its affiliates117
failed to pay Massachusetts corporate excise taxes in connection with the
forced liquidation of stock shares that resulted in approximately $500 million
in capital gains,  as the Comcast’s affiliate reported the gains on its federal118
tax return, but not on its Massachusetts corporate excise tax return.  The119
commissioner claimed that there was no legitimate business or economic
purpose for reorganizing Teleport into a Massachusetts corporate trust,
Continental Holding, prior to the TCG stock sale.120
Pursuant to an administrative summons, the DOR’s commissioner sought
the production of documents which Comcast asserted were protected by the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.  The commissioner of121
the DOR challenged the applicability of privileges to six particular documents
withheld by Comcast, including Andersen’s different parts of drafts and the
final memoranda prepared before the corporate reorganization.  These122
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to the TCG stock sale, including documents relating to Teleport reorganization into Continental Holding.
Generally, Comcast produced various responsive documents, but withheld Andersen’s memorandums under
the attorney-client privilege and work-products doctrine. The six requested documents are identified as
follows: first draft of the Andersen memorandum, two identical documents that appear to be the second
draft of memorandum, two identical documents to the second draft of memorandum but each missing its
first page, and the final version of memorandum.).
123. Id. at 1192.
124. Id. at 1193 (noting that the commissioner requested all documents listed on Comcast’s privilege
log and all unredacted versions of redacted documents).
125. Id.
126. Id. (noting that the Superior Court also denied commissioner’s subsequent motions for
reconsideration).
127. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1195 (referencing communication from US West to Ottinger).
128. Id. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 918 (recognizing the derivative privilege).
129. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196.
130. Id.
documents consisted of sixteen single-spaced pages of detailed stock sale
analysis under application of Massachusetts law.123
The commissioner requested the Superior Court to compel production of
documents that Comcast claimed as privileged.  However, the court denied124
the commissioner’s motion holding that Andersen’s memoranda were
protected by attorney-client privilege because they contained detailed analysis
of Massachusetts tax law and provided information necessary for effective
client representation.  Further, the court held that the memoranda were125
protected by the work-product doctrine because they were prepared in
anticipation of litigation.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court on its own126
initiative transferred the case from the Massachusetts Court of Appeals.
1. The Advice Rendered by Andersen’s Accountants to Comcast Was Not
Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege
On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the commissioner argued
that Comcast did not meet its burden in establishing that attorney-client
privilege applied, for three reasons: (1) Comcast did not submit any proof that
the Andersen memoranda contained confidential communication from the
client;  (2) the Andersen memoranda did not fall within the derivative127
privilege;  and (3) the Superior Court improperly expanded the privilege128
where narrow construction was required.129
The court disagreed with the commissioner’s first argument that the US
West sale of Continental’s stake in TCG or the US West restructuring of
Teleport were not confidential.  It concluded that the commissioner’s first130
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131. Id.
132. Id. at 1197.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1200.
135. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1200.
136. Id.
137. Sheldon H. Laskin, The Attorney Work Product Decision in Comcast, a MA Tax Practice
Insight, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3540 (Apr. 23, 2009), available at LEXIS (“In this case, Ottinger did not
consult Andersen so that Andersen could translate or interpret US West’s proposed transaction. Instead,
Ottinger consulted Andersen so that Andersen could render advice as to whether the proposed transaction
would be subject to Massachusetts tax. The Court ruled this consultation does not come within the Kovel
rule. Therefore, Ottinger’s communication to Andersen waived the attorney-client privilege.”).
argument was based on the incorrect assertion that attorney-client privilege
applies only where the client’s information that is the subject of the
communication is confidential. The court held that Ottinger intended and took
adequate steps to keep the communications with Andersen confidential and
that Andersen received from counsel private information about US West’s
disposition of TCG stock.131
The commissioner’s second argument that derivative privilege did not
apply to Comcast’s documents was based on two assertions. First, the
commissioner argued that the derivative privilege only applies where
accountant’s services are necessary to translate or interpret documents to
facilitate attorney’s understanding in order to render requested legal advice.132
Second, the commissioner argued that derivative privilege did not apply since
US West sought professional tax advice and not legal advice of an attorney.133
Although the court recognized the difficulty of providing a clear distinction
between legal, tax, or accounting advice, the court sided with the
commissioner’s argument that advice rendered by Andersen was not covered
by the attorney-client privilege.  The court stated that advice provided by134
Andersen’s accountants was not covered by the attorney-client privilege,
derivative or otherwise.  Further, the court stated that since Ottinger sought135
the tax advice from an Andersen accountant, and not lawyers, the attorney-
client privilege did not apply.  Accordingly, the court held that the attorney-136
client privilege did not protect communications between Ottinger and
Andersen’s accountants.137
2. Work-Product Doctrine Saves Comcast’s Documents from Disclosure
The court also had to determine whether the work-product doctrine’s
protection was applicable to the Andersen’s memoranda—litigation analysis
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138. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1203 (citing United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir.
1998)).
139. Id. at 1204–05 (noting that the commissioner argued that the Andersen memoranda did not
“meet that test because they were prepared to ‘avoid the prospect of litigation,’ and because . . . Ottinger’s
‘conclusory assertions fall far short of demonstrating a specific prospect of litigation’”).
140. Id. at 1205 (citing United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing United States v. Textron, Inc., 553 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2009)).
144. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1205 (citing Ward v. Peabody, 405 N.E.2d 973 (1980)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
prepared by accountants to inform a business decision which turns on party’s
assessment of the likely litigation outcome expected to result from the
transaction.  The commissioner argued that memoranda prepared by138
Andersen do not meet the “because of” test because they were prepared to
“avoid the prospect of litigation” and because Ottinger failed to demonstrate
a specific prospect of litigation.139
The court applied the “because of” test and disagreed with the
commissioner’s contentions. It relied on the Adlman decision, which stated
that work-product doctrine extends to litigation analysis prepared to facilitate
a party’s informed business decision process.  The court held that based on140
a review of Andersen’s retention and consequently created memoranda, the
documents were prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.141
The evidence considered, such as Ottinger’s affidavit, showed there was a
reasonable possibility that the Massachusetts DOR would challenge the
transaction in light of substantial gains recognized by US West during the
divestment of TCG shares, thus requiring a discussion and business planning
to prepare for possible future litigation.  The court stated that Andersen’s142
memoranda would not have been “prepared irrespective of prospect of
litigation”  and were created “because of” a reasonable possibility of143
litigation with the DOR.  Further, the court stated that Andersen’s144
memoranda constituted opinion work product as they contained mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, and the commissioner
had failed to satisfy the burden of demonstrating “extremely unusual”
circumstances to overcome the protection of the work-product doctrine.145
Accordingly, the court stated that even though the Andersen memoranda were
not protected by the attorney-client privilege, they were protected by the work-
product doctrine.146
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147. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 22 (1st Cir. 2009). See above comment regarding
the Textron case.
148. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL pt. 4, ch. 10, § 20 (2004), available
at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-020.html#d0e46 (“These workpapers reflect an estimate of a
company’s tax liabilities and may also be referred to as the tax pool analysis, tax liability contingency
analysis, tax cushion analysis, or tax contingency reserve analysis . . . . The name given the workpapers by
the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s accountant, or the independent auditor is not determinative.”).
149. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142 (D.R.I. 2007) (stating that “because
there is no immutable definition of the term ‘tax accrual workpapers,’ the documents that make up a
corporation’s ‘tax accrual workpapers’ may vary from case to case”). See Steve R. Johnson, The Work
Product Doctrine and Tax Accrual Workpapers, 124 TAX NOTES 155 (2009) (stating that definitional
issues arise “because [1] companies have different types of potential tax exposure, [2] companies organize
their records in different ways, [3] companies’ accountants may have different needs or prefer different
types and formats of material, [and 4] companies differ in how they use in-house and outside counsel in
preparing or review tax analyses”).
150. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 813.
151. Textron, 577 F.3d at 22.
152. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(l), 78(m) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2009).
153. Textron, 577 F.3d at 22–23 (stating that contingent tax liabilities affect portrayal of assets and
B. Textron
In Textron, the main issue for the court to decide was whether the
attorney work-product doctrine shields from IRS summons “tax accrual work
papers” prepared by lawyers and other professionals in Textron’s in-house tax
department to support Textron’s calculation of tax reserves for its audited
corporate financial statements.  The IRS defines tax accrual work papers as147
audit work papers that were prepared by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s
accountant, or the independent auditor and that relate to the tax reserve for
current, deferred and potential or contingent tax liabilities.  However, the148
documents that constitute the corporation’s tax accrual work papers may vary
from case to case.  These tax accrual work papers can “pinpoint the soft149
spots on a corporation’s tax return by highlighting those areas in which the
corporate taxpayer has taken a position that may, at some later date, require
the payment of additional taxes.”150
Textron is a publicly-traded company and a major aerospace and
defensive conglomerate with over 100 subsidiaries, which is regularly audited
by the IRS.  Textron is required by federal securities law to have its public151
financial statements certified by an independent auditor.  The preparation of152
the financial statements requires Textron to calculate reserves to be entered
on its books to account for any contingent tax liabilities, which include
estimates of potential liability if the IRS challenges Textron’s position on the
tax return.  The calculation of reserves includes preparation of work papers153
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earnings).
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id.
156. Id. (stating that spreadsheet calculations of reserves may be supported by various emails or
notes).
157. Id. (“A company’s published financial statements do not normally identify the specific tax items
on the return that may be debatable but incorporate or reflect only the total reserve figure.”).
158. Id.
159. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2009).
160. Textron, 577 F.3d at 23–24 (stating that Textron Financial purchased equipment from a foreign
utility or transit operator and leased the equipment back to the seller on the same day. Although the SILO
transaction is considered legitimate, the IRS identifies it as a listed transaction. SILO transactions allow tax-
exempt or tax-indifferent organizations (ex. city-owned transit authority) to transfer depreciation and
interest deductions from which they cannot benefit to other taxpayers, who may use them to shelter their
income from taxation. In SILO transactions where the sole motive is tax avoidance, the IRS may disregard
the transaction and assess taxes on the wrongfully sheltered income.). See AWG Leasing Trust v. United
States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
161. Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 (noting that the administrative summons was issued pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 7602. The IRS policy directly requests all workpapers for the tax year in question where the
taxpayer claims benefits from a multiple listed transaction.). See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27
I.R.B. (July 8, 2002).
which describe Textron’s potential liabilities for future taxes and explain
calculations to the certifying independent auditor.  Textron’s tax department154
lists the tax return items that the IRS may challenge resulting in additional
taxes and percentage estimates of the IRS’s chances of successful challenge.155
Calculations are conducted to fix the reserve amount, which is entered on the
books for certain tax items.  The result of all calculations is the reported total156
reserve figure.157
Although the IRS does not automatically request tax accrual work papers
from taxpayers, the IRS seeks these documents where it has concluded that the
taxpayer had engaged in certain listed transactions.  A listed transaction is158
a transaction that the IRS has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and
is identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance.  In159
2003, the IRS audited Textron’s corporate taxes for 1998–2001 and
determined from Textron’s 2001 tax return that Textron’s subsidiary, Textron
Financial Corp. (“Textron Financial”), had engaged in nine listed transactions
known as sale-in lease-out (“SILO”) transactions.160
To determine the accuracy of Textron’s tax return, the IRS issued an
administrative summons, which allows the IRS to examine any books, papers,
records, or other data, which may be relevant or material to IRS inquiry.161
The administrative summons further requested work papers created by
Textron’s outside accounting firm in determining the adequacy of Textron’s
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162. Textron, 577 F.3d at 24.
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tax reserves.  Although Textron had provided such documents to its outside162
accounting firm, it refused to provide them to the IRS, which resulted in
litigation.  The contents of requested work papers included summary163
spreadsheets showing for each disputable item the amount in controversy,
estimates of probability in percentage terms of IRS’s successful challenge,
calculated reserve amounts, back up email and notes.  Some of the “litigation164
hazard percentage” estimates showed the IRS’s success of prevailing during
litigation at 100 percent.165
Revelation of these documents presented a significant concern for
Textron, particularly because of those items with estimates of the IRS’s
probability of success in litigation at 100 percent.  Armed with Textron’s166
internal work papers specifying this litigation hazard percentage, the IRS
would be able to immediately identify Textron’s vulnerabilities and the
specific amounts Textron should be willing to pay to settle each tax matter.167
Textron challenged the IRS summons arguing that it lacked a legitimate
purpose and that information sought by the IRS was protected by the attorney-
client privilege, work-product doctrine, and tax practitioner privilege.168
Conversely, the IRS challenged all of Textron’s claimed privileges.  The169
district court denied the IRS’s petition for enforcement of its administrative
summons because of the work-product doctrine.  However, the court noted170
that Textron-prepared work papers, which might have been protected by the
attorney-client or tax practitioner privilege, lost their privilege protection
when Textron disclosed the work papers to its outside accounting firm.  On171
an appeal, the district court’s decision was upheld by a divided panel, but was
subsequently overturned by the court sitting en banc.172
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held against Textron and stated that
the work product privilege did not apply because work papers were
independently required by statutory and audit requirements.  The court stated173
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that the work product privilege is intended to protect work done for litigation
and not in preparing financial statements.  The court reasoned that any174
experienced litigator would describe tax accrual papers as tax documents and
not as materials prepared for litigation.  The purpose of Textron’s work175
papers was to make book entries, prepare financial statements and obtain an
approval of an independent auditor.  The tax work papers were prepared to176
determine if Textron was adequately reserved with respect to any future
dispute or litigation.  Even if litigation with the IRS was remote, Textron177
would still have to prepare work papers to support their calculations of the tax
reserves.  Accordingly, the tax reserve figures and accompanying178
calculations were created to support the financial statements and the
independent audit.179
The court found additional auxiliary reasons to rule against Textron. It
stated that “tax collection is not a game,” even if Textron thinks the disclosure
of its work papers and spreadsheets is “unfair.”  It stressed that180
underpayment and avoidance of taxes threatens public interest in revenue
collection.  The court referenced that the same rules applied to the IRS in181
regards to their unprivileged information, which was equally subject to
discovery rules and available to Textron.  In summary, the court held that182
there was no evidence of Textron’s work papers being unquestionably
prepared for litigation. As a result, the appeals court vacated the district
court’s judgment and remanded it for further proceedings consistent with its
decision.183
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V. METHODS TO PRESERVE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AFTER
COMCAST AND TEXTRON
For any practitioner it is critical that attorney-client, work-product,
accountant-client, and tax practitioner privileges are not indivertibly waived.
Although there is no strategy that will cover all circumstances, there are
general procedures that attorneys may implement in their practice to preserve
privilege.
First, it is important for attorneys to understand the purpose for which the
documents are being created.  The attorney must consider if the document184
is being prepared in the regular course of business, if it is being prepared in
anticipation of litigation, or if the document has a dual purpose. The attorney
must determine if the accountant’s role will be to interpret the law, which
under the Comcast opinion is not protected by attorney-client privilege, or
whether to facilitate and interpret communication between attorney and
client.  After determining that the document was created or is being created185
for a privileged purpose, the attorney should engage into strategic planning to
preserve that privilege.
Second, to protect confidentiality, the attorney working with accountants
should send the accountant a formal letter establishing the scope and purpose
of their relationship.  If any advice is sought because the tax benefits may be186
contested in the future, it is essential that this is communicated from attorney
to accountant at the start of representation, and the engagement letter requests
tax advice in anticipation of the tax dispute.  This will permit the attorney187
to establish the parameters of the accountant’s work, define for which legal
purpose the accountant’s work will be utilized, and provide necessary
supervision ensuring that any document preparation is a work product.  Also,188
if the documents are being reviewed because of or primarily to assist the
attorney in present or future litigation, this purpose should be communicated
to the accountant in the engagement letter.
Third, to enhance the likelihood of preserving a privilege claim during
litigation, all services provided by accountants should be documented as
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thoroughly as possible.  To strengthen the privilege claim, an accountant189
should perform only requested work in accordance with the scope of the
attorney’s written agreement.  Attorney’s engagement and presence during190
the entire period of the accountant’s work will strengthen the argument that
documents are privileged and are prepared in anticipation of litigation.191
Fourth, all privileged documents and materials should be labeled as
privileged and should be treated as confidential to avoid any claims of
waiver.  A privilege log should also be created specifying the nature of the192
document and citing applicable privileges.  Although labeling by itself will193
not protect a document and make it privileged per se, the implementation of
clear standards for labeling of materials and work papers as work product
prepared in anticipation of litigation is recommended.  The work papers194
where the litigation is clearly anticipated and are considered hot-button issues
for the taxing authorities should be separated from less sensitive tax
documents in order to limit any potential disclosures.  After separation, these195
documents should be retained and treated under appropriate confidentiality
precautions, such as being indexed and held in a locked file space and
specifying the purpose of the documents.  Further, FIN 48 documentation196
should be further separated from all other files due to its sensitivity for tax
liability exposure.197
Fifth, the attorney should review the external (independent) accountant’s
policies regarding document retention and extension of privilege to the
rendered opinion. When a tax opinion from an outside accountant is produced
it should clearly describe its purpose and application, whether it is
confidential, if it was prepared for the purposes of anticipated litigation, and
state for which purposes the opinion should be considered confidential. It is
recommended that any external accountant should not be allowed to retain a
copy of a company’s transactional or tax accrual papers.198
Finally, it has been suggested that hiring an outside counsel in
determining whether there is tax exposure is a good indication that there is a
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genuine concern for anticipated litigation.  During the entire engagement199
with an accountant, the attorney must maintain and document all applicable
documents to which privilege should be extended.200
As new case law develops, the companies and practitioners must
reconsider their current practices and strategies, and adapt to the new
standards in order to preserve their clients privileged documents and
communications. The Comcast and Textron opinions exemplify that applicable
privilege law continues to change and that attorneys, accountants, and tax
practitioners must stay current in order to provide diligent services to their
corporate clients.
VI. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The parameters of the attorney-client privilege, work-product doctrine,
accountant-client privilege, and tax practitioner privileges have been
continuously evolving and changing. The recent decisions of Comcast and
Textron demonstrate that courts continue to narrow and limit privilege law as
it is applied to complex tax transactions and tax documents. Consequently,
today only limited privilege protection is recognized for attorney
communications with accountants.  Thus, the practitioners and their service201
providers, such as accountants, should be mindful of recent holdings in
Comcast and Textron as they create materials for business and transactional
purposes that may be subject to future litigation.202
The Comcast and Textron decisions also add additional uncertainty to an
already vastly litigious area of the law. The courts have previously split
interpretation of the phrase of “anticipation in litigation” between “primary
purpose” and “because of” tests.  According to Textron’s dissenting opinion,203
Textron’s holding proceeded to further split the application of the “because
of” test while rejecting that test’s protection for dual purpose documents and
created a new test of “prepared for” use in litigation.  Such differences of204
tests and standards make the practice of law and compliance not only difficult,
but also unpredictable.
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Additionally, the Textron and Comcast decisions add uncertainty to
corporate strategy and tax planning. Today, almost every business decision by
a company has a legal dimension, which often requires attorneys to seek
advice from outside accountants. The differences between the state and local
laws and regulations make such communication a necessity not only as part
of corporate due diligence process, but also as part of compliance with the
law. Complicated scenarios also exist when documents have dual purpose of
compliance or are being created in the regular course of business and prepared
where litigation is also a possibility.  In states that recognize an accountant-205
client privilege, it is unknown if this privilege will protect client’s private
communications and documents when attorney-client privilege or work-
product doctrine become inapplicable. As the area of privileged
communications law continues to remain uncertain and change, corporate
attorneys and their clients cannot simply rely on the belief that their
communications and documents will remain protected from discovery by the
taxing authorities.206
The dissent in Textron urges the Supreme Court to intervene and clarify
the current uncertainty present between the circuits. Such intervention is
necessary and essential to the daily practice of litigators,  accountants, tax207
practitioners, consultants, and corporate clients. It is unlikely that the courts
could envision the difficulty their decisions would create on the current
transactional and tax practice. Thus, unless clarity is provided, either through
a Supreme Court decision or through federal legislation, privileged
communications in complex tax and transactional matters will continue to be
a highly unpredictable and uncertain area of the law, which can significantly
affect corporate clients and their respective legal, accounting, and tax
professionals.
